REMARKS

Claim 1 has been amended to recite that the claimed antibody is isolated. Applicants submit that no new matter was added by this amendment, and support for this amendment can be found in the specification, for example at paragraph [246]. Claims 1-5 remain pending. Applicants respond below to the specific rejections raised by the PTO in the Office Action mailed July 29, 2005. For the reasons set forth below, Applicants respectfully traverse.

Rejection under 35 U.S.C. §101 - Utility

The PTO rejects Claims 1-5 as allegedly not supported by a specific and substantial asserted utility or a well established utility. The Examiner argues that since further research is required to determine whether the increase in PRO1268 mRNA supports a role for the antibody in detecting or treating cancerous tissue, the asserted utility of antibodies to the PRO1268 polypeptide is not substantial.

The PTO points to three journal articles as demonstrating that what is often seen as a lack of correlation between mRNA levels and increased levels, that polypeptide levels cannot be accurately predicted from mRNA levels, and that there is no correlation with a known role in disease for genes less with less than 5-fold change in expression.

Applicants respectfully disagree and submit that for the reasons stated below, the claimed antibodies have a credible, substantial, and specific utility.

Utility – Legal Standard

According to the Utility Examination Guidelines ("Utility Guidelines"), 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (2001) an invention complies with the utility requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101 if it has at least one asserted "specific, substantial, and credible utility" or a "well-established utility."

Under the Utility Guidelines, a utility is "specific" when it is particular to the subject matter claimed. For example, it is generally not enough to state that a nucleic acid is useful as a diagnostic tool without also identifying the condition that is to be diagnosed.

The requirement of "substantial utility" defines a "real world" use, and derives from the Supreme Court's holding in *Brenner v. Manson*, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) stating that "The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with substantial utility." In explaining the

"substantial utility" standard, M.P.E.P. § 2107.01 cautions, however, that Office personnel must be careful not to interpret the phrase "immediate benefit to the public" or similar formulations used in certain court decisions to mean that products or services based on the claimed invention must be "currently available" to the public in order to satisfy the utility requirement. "Rather, any reasonable use that an applicant has identified for the invention that can be viewed as providing a public benefit should be accepted as sufficient, at least with regard to defining a 'substantial' utility." (M.P.E.P. § 2107.01, emphasis added).

The mere consideration that further experimentation might be performed to more fully develop the claimed subject matter does not support a finding of lack of utility. M.P.E.P. § 2107.01 III cites *In re Brana*, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1995) in stating that "Usefulness in patent law ... necessarily includes the expectation of further research and development. The stage at which an invention in this field becomes useful is well before it is ready to be administered to humans." Further, "[T]o violate § 101 the claimed device must be totally incapable of achieving a useful result" *Juicy Whip Inc. v. Orange Bang Inc.*, 51 USPQ2d 1700 (Fed. Cir. 1999), *citing Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.*, 977 F.2d 1555, 1571 (Fed.Cir.1992).

Indeed, the Guidelines for Examination of Applications for Compliance With the Utility Requirement, set forth in M.P.E.P. § 2107 II(B)(1) gives the following instruction to patent examiners: "If the applicant has asserted that the claimed invention is useful for any particular practical purpose ... and the assertion would be considered credible by a person of ordinary skill in the art, do not impose a rejection based on lack of utility."

Finally, in assessing the credibility of the asserted utility, the M.P.E.P. states that "to overcome the presumption of truth that an assertion of utility by the applicant enjoys" the PTO must establish that it is "more likely than not that one of ordinary skill in the art would doubt (i.e., "question") the truth of the statement of utility." M.P.E.P. § 2107.02 III A. The M.P.E.P. cautions that:

Rejections under 35 U.S.C. 101 have been rarely sustained by federal courts. Generally speaking, in these rare cases, the 35 U.S.C. 101 rejection was sustained [] because the applicant ... asserted a utility that could only be true if it violated a scientific principle, such as the second law of thermodynamics, or a law of nature, or was wholly inconsistent with contemporary knowledge in the art. M.P.E.P. § 2107.02 III B., citing In re Gazave, 379 F.2d 973, 978, 154

U.S.P.Q. 92, 96 (CCPA 1967) (underline emphasis in original, bold emphasis added).

<u>Utility need NOT be Proved to a Statistical Certainty – a Reasonable Correlation between the Evidence and the Asserted Utility is Sufficient</u>

An Applicant's assertion of utility creates a presumption of utility that will be sufficient to satisfy the utility requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101, "unless there is a reason for one skilled in the art to question the objective truth of the statement of utility or its scope." *In re Langer*, 503 F.2d 1380, 1391, 183 USPQ 288, 297 (CCPA 1974). *See, also In re Jolles*, 628 F.2d 1322, 206 USPQ 885 (CCPA 1980); *In re Irons*, 340 F.2d 974, 144 USPQ 351 (1965); *In re Sichert*, 566 F.2d 1154, 1159, 196 USPQ 209, 212-13 (CCPA 1977). Compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 101 is a question of fact. *Raytheon v. Roper*, 724 F.2d 951, 956, 220 USPQ 592, 596 (Fed. Cir. 1983) cert. denied, 469 US 835 (1984). The evidentiary standard to be used throughout *ex parte* examination in setting forth a rejection is a preponderance of the evidence, or "more likely than not" standard. *In re Oetiker*, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445, 24 USPQ2d 1443, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1992). This is stated explicitly in the M.P.E.P.:

[T]he applicant does not have to provide evidence sufficient to establish that an asserted utility is true "beyond a reasonable doubt." Nor must the applicant provide evidence such that it establishes an asserted utility as a matter of statistical certainty. Instead, evidence will be sufficient if, considered as a whole, it leads a person of ordinary skill in the art to conclude that the asserted utility is more likely than not true. M.P.E.P. at § 2107.02, part VII (2004) (underline emphasis in original, bold emphasis added, internal citations omitted).

The PTO has the initial burden to offer evidence "that one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably doubt the asserted utility." *In re Brana*, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Only then does the burden shift to the Applicant to provide rebuttal evidence. *Id.* As stated in the M.P.E.P., such rebuttal evidence does not need to absolutely prove that the asserted utility is real. Rather, the evidence only needs to be reasonably indicative of the asserted utility.

In Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1895 (Fed. Cir. 1996), the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld a PTO decision that *in vitro* testing of a novel pharmaceutical compound was sufficient to establish practical utility, stating the following rule:

[T]esting is often required to establish practical utility. But the test results need not absolutely prove that the compound is pharmacologically active. All that is

required is that the tests be "reasonably indicative of the desired [pharmacological] response." In other words, there must be a sufficient correlation between the tests and an asserted pharmacological activity so as to convince those skilled in the art, to a reasonable probability, that the novel compound will exhibit the asserted pharmacological behavior." Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1564, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1895 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted, bold emphasis added, italics in original).

While the *Fujikawa* case was in the context of utility for pharmaceutical compounds, the principals stated by the Court are applicable in the instant case where the asserted utility is for a therapeutic and diagnostic use – utility does not have to be established to an absolute certainty, rather, the evidence must convince a person of skill in the art "to a reasonable probability." In addition, the evidence need not be direct, so long as there is a "sufficient correlation" between the tests performed and the asserted utility.

The Court in *Fujikawa* relied in part on its decision in *Cross v. Iizuka*, 753 F.2d 1040, 224 U.S.P.Q. 739 (Fed. Cir. 1985). In *Cross*, the Appellant argued that basic *in vitro* tests conducted in cellular fractions did not establish a practical utility for the claimed compounds. Appellant argued that more sophisticated *in vitro* tests using intact cells, or *in vivo* tests, were necessary to establish a practical utility. The Court in *Cross* rejected this argument, instead favoring the argument of the Appellee:

[I]n vitro results...are generally predictive of in vivo test results, i.e., there is a reasonable correlation therebetween. Were this not so, the testing procedures of the pharmaceutical industry would not be as they are. [Appellee] has not urged, and rightly so, that there is an invariable exact correlation between in vitro test results and in vivo test results. Rather, [Appellee's] position is that successful in vitro testing for a particular pharmacological activity establishes a significant probability that in vivo testing for this particular pharmacological activity will be successful. Cross v. Iizuka, 753 F.2d 1040, 1050, 224 U.S.P.Q. 739 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (emphasis added).

The *Cross* case is very similar to the present case. Like *in vitro* testing in the pharmaceutical industry, those of skill in the field of biotechnology rely on the reasonable correlation that exists between gene expression and protein expression (see below). Were there no reasonable correlation between the two, the techniques that measure gene levels such as microarray analysis, differential display, and quantitative PCR would not be so widely used by those in the art. As in *Cross*, Applicants here do not argue that there is "an invariable exact correlation" between gene expression and protein expression. Instead, Applicants' position

detailed below is that a measured change in gene expression in cancer cells establishes a "significant probability" that the expression of the encoded polypeptide in cancer will also be changed based on "a reasonable correlation therebetween."

Taken together, the legal standard for demonstrating utility is a relatively low hurdle. An Applicant need only provide evidence such that it is more likely than not that a person of skill in the art would be convinced, to a reasonable probability, that the asserted utility is true. The evidence need not be direct evidence, so long as there is a reasonable correlation between the evidence and the asserted utility. The Applicant does not need to provide evidence such that it establishes an asserted utility as a matter of statistical certainty.

Even assuming that the PTO has met its initial burden to offer evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably doubt the truth of the asserted utility, Applicants assert that they have met their burden of providing rebuttal evidence such that it is more likely than not those skilled in the art, to a reasonable probability, would believe that the claimed invention is useful as a diagnostic tool for cancer.

Substantial Utility

Summary of Applicants' Arguments and the PTO's Response

In an attempt to clarify Applicants' argument, Applicants offer a summary of their argument and the disputed issues involved. Applicants assert that the claimed antibodies have utility as diagnostic tools for cancer, particularly kidney tumor. Applicants are not asserting that the claimed antibodies necessarily provide a definitive diagnosis of kidney cancer, but rather that they are useful, alone or in combination with other diagnostic tools, to assist in the diagnosis of kidney cancer. Applicants' asserted utility rests on the following argument:

- 1. Applicants have provided reliable evidence that mRNA for the PRO1268 polypeptide is at least two-fold higher in kidney tumor tissue compared to normal kidney tissue;
- 2. Applicants assert that it is well-established in the art that a change in the level of mRNA for a particular protein, e.g. an increase, generally leads to a corresponding change in the level of the encoded protein, e.g. an increase;
- 3. Given Applicants' evidence that the level of mRNA for the PRO1268 polypeptide is increased in kidney tumor compared to normal kidney tissue, it is likely that the PRO1268 polypeptide is also differentially expressed in kidney tumors and is therefore useful as a

diagnostic tool to distinguish kidney tumor tissue from normal kidney tissue. Polypeptides such as PRO1268 which are differentially expressed in certain cancers, and antibodies to such polypeptides, are useful as diagnostic tools.

Applicants understand the PTO to be making two arguments in response to Applicants' asserted utility:

- 1. The PTO cites Hu *et al.*, Pennica *et al.* and Haynes *et al.* as teaching that transcript expression levels displaying a 5-fold change or less in tumor compared to normal did not evidence a correlation between altered gene expression and a known role in disease, and that polypeptide levels cannot be accurately predicted from mRNA levels;
- 2. The PTO asserts that since the specification does not disclose any specific function of the PRO1268 mRNA or polypeptide, the claimed subject matter lacks substantial utility.

As detailed below, Applicants submit that the PTO has failed to meet its initial burden to offer evidence "that one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably doubt the asserted utility." In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1995). First, the PTO has failed to offer any evidence in support of its dismissal of the data in Example 18 and the Declaration of Chris Grimaldi in support of these data. Second, Applicants submit that the Haynes et al., Pennica et al. and Hu et al. references are not contrary to Applicants' arguments, and therefore are not evidence to support the rejection for lack of utility. Third, Applicants submit that it is not necessary for the specification to teach the function of the PRO1268 polypeptide in order for the claimed subject matter to have utility. Finally, even if the PTO has met its initial burden, Applicants have submitted enough rebuttal evidence such that it is more likely than not that a person of skill in the art would be convinced, to a reasonable probability, that the asserted utility is true. As stated above, Applicants' evidence need not be direct evidence, so long as there is a reasonable correlation between the evidence and the asserted utility. The standard is not absolute certainty.

Applicants have established that the Gene Encoding the PRO1268 Polypeptide is Differentially Expressed in Kidney Tumor compared to Normal Kidney Tissue

Applicants submit that the experimental evidence provided in Example 18 and supported by the previously submitted declarations demonstrate that mRNA encoding the PRO1268 polypeptide is differentially expressed in kidney tumor relative to normal kidney tissue. Further,

because it is well-established in the art that a change in the level of mRNA for a particular protein generally leads to a corresponding change in the level of the encoded protein, it is likely that the PRO1268 polypeptide is also differentially expressed in kidney tumors

Regarding the gene expression data in the specification, Example 18 shows that the mRNA associated with protein PRO1268 was more highly expressed in kidney tumor tissue compared to normal kidney tissue. Gene expression was analyzed using standard semi-quantitative PCR amplification reactions of cDNA libraries isolated from different human tumor and normal human tissue samples. Identification of the differential expression of the PRO1268 polypeptide-encoding gene in kidney tumor tissue compared to the corresponding normal tissue renders the molecule useful as a diagnostic tool for the determination of the presence or absence of kidney tumor. In support, Applicants previously submitted as Exhibit A in the Response mailed September 24, 2004, a first Declaration of J. Christopher Grimaldi, an expert in the field of cancer biology. This declaration explains the importance of the data in Example 18, and how differential gene and protein expression studies are used to differentiate between normal and tumor tissue (see Declaration, paragraph 7).

In paragraph 5 of his declaration, Mr. Grimaldi states that the gene expression studies reported in Example 18 of the instant application were made from pooled samples of normal and of tumor tissues. Mr. Grimaldi explains that:

The DNA libraries used in the gene expression studies were made from pooled samples of normal and of tumor tissues. Data from pooled samples is more likely to be accurate than data obtained from a sample from a single individual. That is, the detection of variations in gene expression is likely to represent a more generally relevant condition when pooled samples from normal tissues are compared with pooled samples from tumors in the same tissue type. (Paragraph 5) (emphasis added).

In paragraphs 6 and 7, Mr. Grimaldi explains that the semi-quantitative analysis employed to generate the data of Example 18 is sufficient to determine if a gene is over- or under-expressed in tumor cells compared to corresponding normal tissue. He states that any visually detectable difference seen between two samples is indicative of at least a two-fold difference in cDNA between the tumor tissue and the counterpart normal tissue. Thus, the results of Example 18 reflect at least a two-fold difference between normal and tumor samples. He also states that the results of the gene expression studies indicate that the genes of interest "can be used to differentiate tumor from normal," thus establishing their reliability. He explains

that, "The precise levels of gene expression are irrelevant; what matters is that there is a relative difference in expression between normal tissue and tumor tissue." (Paragraph 7). Thus, since it is the relative level of expression between normal tissue and suspected cancerous tissue that is important, the precise level of expression in normal tissue is irrelevant. Likewise, there is no need for quantitative data to compare the level of expression in normal and tumor tissue. As Mr. Grimaldi states, "If a difference is detected, this indicates that the gene and its corresponding polypeptide and antibodies against the polypeptide are useful for diagnostic purposes, to screen samples to differentiate between normal and tumor."

Applicants submit that the declaration of Mr. Grimaldi is based on personal knowledge of the relevant facts at issue. Mr. Grimaldi is an expert in the field and conducted or supervised the experiments at issue. Applicants remind the PTO that "[o]ffice personnel must accept an opinion from a qualified expert that is based upon relevant facts whose accuracy is not being questioned." PTO Utility Examination Guidelines (2001) (emphasis added). In addition, declarations relating to issues of fact should not be summarily dismissed as "opinions" without an adequate explanation of how the declaration fails to rebut the Examiner's position. *In re Alton* 76 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Mr. Grimaldi has personal knowledge of the relevant facts, has based his opinion on those facts, and the PTO has offered no reason or evidence to reject either the underlying facts or his opinion. Therefore, the PTO should accept Mr. Grimaldi's opinion with regard to his statement that "any visually detectable difference seen between two samples is indicative of at least a two-fold difference in cDNA between the tumor tissue and the counterpart normal tissue" and that the genes of interest "can be used to differentiate tumor from normal." Together, these statements establish that there is at least a two-fold difference in expression, and that the results are reliable enough that they can be used to distinguish tumor from normal tissue.

In conclusion, Applicants submit that the evidence reported in Example 18, combined with the first Grimaldi Declaration, establish that there is at least a two-fold difference in PRO1268 cDNA between kidney tumor tissue and normal kidney tissue. Therefore, it follows that expression levels of the PRO1268 gene can be used to distinguish kidney tumor tissue from normal kidney tissue. The PTO has not offered any significant arguments or evidence to the contrary.

As Applicants explain below, it is more likely than not that the PRO1268 polypeptide is also differentially expressed in kidney tumor tissue, and can therefore be used to distinguish

kidney tumor tissue from normal kidney tissue. This provides utility for the disclosed polypeptides and claimed antibodies.

Applicants have established that the Accepted Understanding in the Art is that there is a Direct Correlation between mRNA Levels and the Level of Expression of the Encoded Protein

Applicants next turn to the second portion of their argument in support of their asserted utility – that it is well-established in the art that a change in the level of mRNA for a particular protein generally leads to a corresponding change in the level of the encoded protein; given Applicants' evidence of differential expression of the mRNA for the PRO1268 polypeptide in kidney tumor, it is more likely than not that the PRO1268 polypeptide is also differentially expressed; and proteins differentially expressed in certain tumors, as well as antibodies to such proteins, have utility as diagnostic tools.

In support of the assertion that changes in mRNA are positively correlated to changes in protein levels, Applicants previously submitted a copy of a second Declaration by J. Christopher Grimaldi, an expert in the field of cancer biology. As stated in paragraph 5 of the declaration, "Those who work in this field are well aware that in the vast majority of cases, when a gene is over-expressed...the gene product or polypeptide will also be over-expressed.... This same principal applies to gene under-expression." Further, "the detection of increased mRNA expression is expected to result in increased polypeptide expression, and the detection of decreased mRNA expression is expected to result in decreased polypeptide expression. The detection of increased or decreased polypeptide expression can be used for cancer diagnosis and treatment." The references cited in the declaration and submitted herewith support this statement.

Applicants also previously submitted a copy of the declaration of Paul Polakis, Ph.D., an expert in the field of cancer biology. As stated in paragraph 6 of his declaration:

Based on my own experience accumulated in more than 20 years of research, including the data discussed in paragraphs 4 and 5 above [showing a positive correlation between mRNA levels and encoded protein levels in the vast majority of cases] and my knowledge of the relevant scientific literature, it is my considered scientific opinion that for human genes, an increased level of mRNA in a tumor cell relative to a normal cell typically correlates to a similar increase in abundance of the encoded protein in the tumor cell relative to the normal cell. In fact, it remains a central dogma in molecular biology that increased mRNA levels

are predictive of corresponding increased levels of the encoded protein. (Emphasis added).

Dr. Polakis acknowledges that there are published cases where such a correlation does not exist, but states that it is his opinion, based on over 20 years of scientific research, that "such reports are exceptions to the commonly understood general rule that increased mRNA levels are predictive of corresponding increased levels of the encoded protein." (Polakis Declaration, paragraph 6).

The statements of Grimaldi and Polakis are supported by the teachings in Molecular Biology of the Cell, a leading textbook in the field (Bruce Alberts, *et al.*, Molecular Biology of the Cell (3rd ed. 1994) (previously submitted) and (4th ed. 2002) (previously submitted). Figure 9-2 of Alberts 3rd ed. shows the steps at which eucaryotic gene expression can be controlled. The first step depicted is transcriptional control. Alberts 3rd ed. provides that "[f]or most genes transcriptional controls are paramount. This makes sense because, of all the possible control points illustrated in Figure 9-2, only transcriptional control ensures that no superfluous intermediates are synthesized." Alberts 3rd ed. at 403 (emphasis added). In addition, the text states that "Although controls on the initiation of gene transcription are the predominant form of regulation for most genes, other controls can act later in the pathway from RNA to protein to modulate the amount of gene product that is made." Alberts 3rd ed. at 453 (emphasis added). Thus, as established in Alberts 3rd ed., the predominant mechanism for regulating the amount of protein produced is by regulating transcription initiation.

In Alberts 4th ed., Figure 6-3 on page 302 illustrates the basic principle that there is a correlation between increased gene expression and increased protein expression. The accompanying text states that "a cell can change (or regulate) the expression of each of its genes according to the needs of the moment – *most obviously by controlling the production of its mRNA*." Alberts 4th ed. at 302 (emphasis added). Similarly, Figure 6-90 on page 364 of Alberts 4th ed. illustrates the path from gene to protein. The accompanying text states that while potentially each step can be regulated by the cell, "the initiation of transcription is the most common point for a cell to regulate the expression of each of its genes." Alberts 4th ed. at 364 (emphasis added). This point is repeated on page 379, where the authors state that of all the possible points for regulating protein expression, "[f]or most genes transcriptional controls are paramount." Alberts 4th ed. at 379 (emphasis added).

Further support for Applicants' position can be found in the textbook, Genes VI, (Benjamin Lewin, Genes VI (1997)) (previously submitted) which states "having acknowledged that control of gene expression can occur at multiple stages, and that production of RNA cannot inevitably be equated with production of protein, it is clear that the overwhelming majority of regulatory events occur at the initiation of transcription." Genes VI at 847-848 (emphasis added).

Additional support is also found in Zhigang et al., World Journal of Surgical Oncology 2:13, 2004 (previously submitted). Zhigang studied the expression of prostate stem cell antigen (PSCA) protein and mRNA to validate it as a potential molecular target for diagnosis and treatment of human prostate cancer. The data showed "a high degree of correlation between PSCA protein and mRNA expression." Zhigang at 6. Of the samples tested, 81 out of 87 showed a high degree of correlation between mRNA expression and protein expression. The authors conclude that "it is demonstrated that PSCA protein and mRNA overexpressed in human prostate cancer, and that the increased protein level of PSCA was resulted from the upregulated transcription of its mRNA." Zhigang at 11. Even though the correlation between mRNA expression and protein expression occurred in 93% of the samples tested, not 100%, the authors state that "PSCA may be a promising molecular marker for the clinical prognosis of human Pca and a valuable target for diagnosis and therapy of this tumor." Id.

Further, Meric *et al.*, Molecular Cancer Therapeutics, vol. 1, 971-979 (2002) (previously submitted) states the following:

The **fundamental principle** of molecular therapeutics in cancer is to exploit the differences in gene expression between cancer cells and normal cells...[M]ost efforts have concentrated on identifying differences in gene expression at the level of mRNA, which can be attributable to either DNA amplification or to differences in transcription. Meric *et al.* at 971 (emphasis added).

Those of skill in the art would not be focusing on differences in gene expression between cancer cells and normal cells if there were no correlation between gene expression and protein expression.

Together, the declarations of Grimaldi and Polakis, the accompanying references, and the excerpts and references provided above all establish that the accepted understanding in the art is that there is a reasonable correlation between changes in gene expression and the level of the encoded protein.

The PTO's position is unclear regarding whether or not one skilled in the art would expect the PRO1268 polypeptide to be differentially expressed in kidney tumor versus normal kidney tissue. For example, the PTO states:

Given the small increase in amplification of PRO1268 DNA¹ and the evidence provided by the current literature, it is clear that one skilled in the art would not assume that a small increase in amplification would correlate with significantly increased mRNa or polypeptide levels. (Office Action at 4)

However, the PTO also states:

As discussed in the previous Office Action (8 December 2005 (sic)), a 2-fold (a few samples were greater) increase is not large and may be less likely to indicate disease (Hu, et al, 2003, Journal of Proteome Research 2:405-412), or may be sufficient (Applicant's Response, page 12). However, the type or magnitude of increase is not at issue in this case. All that is known about the PRO1268 peptide is that it is increased in one cancerous tissue. It cannot be determined what the function of the protein is in the tissue; certainly the tissue provides no clues. (Office Action at 5; emphasis added)

In view of the above, it appears that the PTO's basis for a lack of utility of the claimed antibodies is not premised on the assertion that one skilled in the art would not expect PRO1268 polypeptide to be differentially expressed in kidney tumor versus normal kidney tissue. Instead, the PTO's rejection for lack of utility of the claimed antibodies appears to be premised on the assertion that the specification does not disclose the function of the PRO1268 protein. Nevertheless, Applicants first address the cited references in view of Applicants' assertion the one skilled in the art would expect differential expression of the disclosed polypeptides in view of the differential PRO1268 mRNA expression, and then turn to the PTO's assertion that the claimed antibodies lack utility because specification does not disclose the function of the PRO1268.

The PTO states that polypeptide levels cannot be accurately predicted from mRNA levels levels, citing Pennica *et al.* and Haynes *et al.* for support.

The PTO cites Pennica *et al.* as teaching "a *lack* of correlation between mRNA levels and increased peptide levels." Office Action at 4, emphasis in original. However, in contrast to the PTO's characterization of the reference, Pennica teaches nothing about a lack of correlation

¹ Applicants would like to clarify that Example 18 used quantitative PCR analysis of a cDNA library to measure DNA expression, not amplification.

between the level of mRNA and the level of protein expression – Pennica did not even look at protein expression. Since Pennica provides no data whatsoever regarding protein expression, nothing in Pennica can support the assertion that there is a lack of correlation between mRNA levels and increased peptide levels. Accordingly, nothing in Pennica is contrary to Applicants' assertion that it is established in the art that changes in the level of mRNA are correlated to the changes in the level of protein.

The PTO cites Haynes *et al.* (Electrophoresis, 19(11):1862-71 (1998)) as teaching that "polypeptide levels cannot be accurately predicted from mRNA levels." Office Action at 4. For the reasons discussed below, Haynes is not contrary to Applicants' asserted utility.

Haynes studied whether there is a correlation between the level of mRNA expression and the level of protein expression for 80 selected genes from yeast. The genes were selected because they constituted a relatively homogeneous group with respect to predicted half-life and expression level of the protein products. *See* Haynes at 1863. Haynes did not examine whether a change in transcript level for a particular gene led to a change in the level of expression of the corresponding protein. Instead, Haynes determined whether the steady-state transcript level correlated with the steady-state level of the corresponding protein based on an analysis of 80 different genes.

Haynes reported to have "found a general trend but no strong correlation between protein and transcript levels." *Id.* However, a cursory inspection of Fig. 1 shows a clear correlation between the mRNA levels and protein levels measured. This correlation is confirmed by an inspection of the full-length research paper from which the data in Fig. 1 were derived, presented as Exhibit 2 in the response mailed June 6, 2005 (Gygi *et al.*, Molecular and Cellular Biology, Mar. 1999, 1720-1730). Gygi states that "there was a general trend of increased protein levels resulting from increased mRNA levels," with a correlation coefficient of 0.935, indicating a strong correlation. Gygi at 1726. Moreover, Gygi also states that the correlation is especially strong for highly expressed mRNAs. *Id.* Thus, it is not clear that Haynes even supports the Examiner's position, as Haynes did report a general trend, and Gygi reports a strong correlation between increasing mRNA levels and increasing protein levels.

The PTO focuses on the portion of Haynes where the authors reported that for some of the studied genes with equivalent mRNA levels, there were differences in corresponding protein expression, including some that varied by more than 50-fold. Similarly, Haynes reports that

different proteins with similar expression levels were maintained by transcript levels that varied by as much as 40-fold. *Id.* Thus, Haynes showed that for one type of yeast, similar mRNA levels for *different* genes did not universally result in equivalent protein levels for the *different* gene products, and similar protein levels for *different* gene products did not universally result from equivalent mRNA levels for the *different* genes. These results are expected, since there are many factors that determine translation efficiency for a given transcript, or the half-life of the encoded protein. Not surprisingly, based on these results, Haynes concluded that protein levels cannot always be accurately predicted from the level of the corresponding mRNA transcript *when looking at the level of transcripts across different genes*.

Importantly, Haynes did <u>not</u> say that for a single gene, the level of mRNA transcript is not positively correlated with the level of protein expression. Applicants have asserted that increasing or decreasing the level of mRNA for the <u>same</u> gene leads to an increase or decrease for the corresponding protein. Haynes did <u>not</u> study this issue and says absolutely nothing about it. Therefore, Haynes is not inconsistent with or contradictory to the utility of the instant claims, and offers no support for the PTO's position.

And even if Haynes supported the PTO's argument, which it does not, one contrary example does not establish that one of skill in the art would find it is more likely than not there is no general correlation between changes in mRNA level and changes in protein level for an individual gene. In fact, the working hypothesis among those skilled in the art, as illustrated by the evidence presented by Applicants, is that there is a positive correlation between changes in mRNA levels and changes in protein levels for a particular gene.

The PTO also cites Hu *et al.* (J. Proteome Res., 2(4):405-12 (2003)) as teaching that transcript expression levels displaying a 5-fold change or less in tumor compared to normal did not evidence a correlation between altered gene expression and a known role in disease.

In Hu, the researchers used an automated literature-mining tool to summarize and estimate the relative strengths of all human gene-disease relationships published on Medline. They then generated a microarray expression dataset comparing breast cancer and normal breast tissue. Using their data-mining tool, they looked for a correlation between the strength of the literature association between the gene and breast cancer, and the magnitude of the difference in expression level. They report that for genes displaying a 5-fold change or less in tumors compared to normal, there was no evidence of a correlation between altered gene expression and

a *known* role in the disease. *See* Hu at 411. However, among genes with a 10-fold or more change in expression level, there was a strong correlation between expression level and a *published* role in the disease. *Id.* at 412. Importantly, Hu reports that the observed correlation was only found among estrogen receptor-positive tumors, not less-prevalent ER-negative tumors. *Id.*

The general findings of Hu are not surprising – one would expect that genes with the greatest change in expression in a disease would be the first targets of research, and therefore have the strongest known relationship to the disease as measured by the number of publications reporting a connection with the disease. The correlation reported in Hu only indicates that the greater the change in expression level, the more likely it is that there is a published or known role for the gene in the disease, as found by their automated literature-mining software. Thus, Hu's results merely reflect a bias in the literature toward studying the most prominent targets, and reflect nothing regarding the ability of a gene that is 2-fold or more differentially expressed in tumors to serve as a disease marker. Hu acknowledges the shortcomings of this method in explaining the disparity in Hu's findings for ER-negative versus ER-positive tumors: Hu attributes the "bias in the literature" toward the more prevalent ER-positive tumors as the explanation for the lack of any correlation between number of publications and gene expression levels in less-prevalent (and, therefore, less studied) ER-negative tumors. Id. Because of this intrinsic bias, Hu's methodology is unlikely to ever note a correlation of a disease with less differentially-expressed genes and their corresponding proteins, regardless of whether or not an actual relationship between the disease and less differentially-expressed genes exists. Accordingly, Hu's methodology yields results that provide little or no information regarding biological significance of genes with less than 5-fold expression change in disease.

Applicants submit that a lack of known role for PRO1268 in cancer does not prevent its use as a diagnostic tool for cancer. There is a difference between use of a gene for distinguishing between tumor and normal tissue on the one hand, and establishing a role for the gene in cancer on the other. Genes with lower levels of change in expression may or may not be the most important genes in causing the disease, but the genes can still show a consistent and measurable change in expression. While such genes may or may not be good targets for further research, they can nonetheless be used as diagnostic tools. Thus, Hu does not refute the Applicants'

assertion that the PRO1268 gene can be used as a cancer diagnostic tool because it is differentially expressed in certain tumors.

Accordingly, Applicants submit that they have offered sufficient evidence to establish that it is more likely than not that one of skill in the art would believe that because the PRO1268 mRNA is more highly expressed in kidney tumor tissue than in normal kidney tissue, the PRO1268 polypeptide will also be more highly expressed in kidney tumor tissue than in normal kidney tissue. Thus, Applicants submit that they have established that it is more likely than not that one of skill in the art would recognize the asserted utility of the disclosed polypeptides and claimed antibodies as cancer diagnostic tools.

It is not necessary to establish the Function of the polypeptide in order to establish Utility for the polypeptide or associated antibodies

The PTO concludes that the claimed antibodies lack utility by stating:

Because Applicants do not know the function of the PRO1268 polypeptide, detecting (by use of the claimed antibodies) the PRO1268 polypeptide has no specific function, since it is not useful to detect a protein for which a function has not yet been identified, and additionally might be expressed in one cancer tissue sample. Since the asserted utility for the PRO1268 antibody is not in currently available form, the asserted utility is not substantial. (Office Action at 6; emphasis in original).

Thus, the PTO appears to base its holding that the claimed antibodies lack utility on the assertion that Applicants have not disclosed the function of the PRO1268 polypeptide.

Applicants submit that a lack of known function for PRO1268 does not prevent use of the claimed antibodies as diagnostic tools for cancer. Whether or not there is a known function of PRO1268 is irrelevant to whether its differential expression can be used to assist in diagnosis of cancer – one does not need to know why PRO1268 is differentially expressed, or what the consequence of the differential expression is, in order to exploit the differential expression to distinguish tumor from normal tissue. In fact the Revised Interim Utility Guidelines promulgated by the PTO recognize that proteins which are differentially expressed in cancer have utility. (See the caveat in Example 12 which state that the utility requirement is satisfied where a protein is expressed in melanoma cells but not on normal skin and antibodies against the protein can be used to diagnose cancer.) In addition, while Applicants appreciate that actions taken in other

applications are not binding on the PTO with respect to the present application, Applicants note that the PTO has issued several patents claiming differentially expressed polypeptides. (See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,414,117 and U.S. Patent No. 6,124,433, previously submitted).

Accordingly, Applicants submit that they have offered sufficient evidence to establish that it is more likely than not that one of skill in the art would believe that because the PRO1268 mRNA is more highly expressed in kidney tumor tissue than in normal kidney tissue, the PRO1268 polypeptide will have the same expression pattern. This assertion does not appear to be questioned by the PTO. This differential expression of PRO1268 suffices to make it, as well as the claimed antibodies, useful as diagnostic tools for cancer; there is no requirement that the function of the PRO1268 polypeptide must be demonstrated in order to establish utility.

The Arguments made by the PTO are Not Sufficient to satisfy the PTO's Initial Burden of Offering Evidence "that one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably doubt the asserted utility"

As stated above, an Applicant's assertion of utility creates a presumption of utility that will be sufficient to satisfy the utility requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101, "unless there is a reason for one skilled in the art to question the objective truth of the statement of utility or its scope." *In re Langer*, 503 F.2d 1380, 1391, 183 USPQ 288, 297 (CCPA 1974). The evidentiary standard to be used throughout *ex parte* examination in setting forth a rejection is a preponderance of the evidence, or "more likely than not" standard. *In re Oetiker*, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445, 24 USPQ2d 1443, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1992). This is stated explicitly in the M.P.E.P.:

[T]he applicant does not have to provide evidence sufficient to establish that an asserted utility is true "beyond a reasonable doubt." Nor must the applicant provide evidence such that it establishes an asserted utility as a matter of statistical certainty. Instead, evidence will be sufficient if, considered as a whole, it leads a person of ordinary skill in the art to conclude that the asserted utility is more likely than not true. M.P.E.P. at § 2107.02, part VII (2004) (underline emphasis in original, bold emphasis added, internal citations omitted).

The PTO has the initial burden to offer evidence "that one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably doubt the asserted utility." *In re Brana*, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Only then does the burden shift to the Applicant to provide rebuttal evidence. *Id.* As stated in the M.P.E.P., such rebuttal evidence does not need to absolutely prove

that the asserted utility is real. Rather, the evidence only needs to be reasonably indicative of the asserted utility.

The PTO has not offered any arguments or cited any references to establish "that one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably doubt" that the disclosed polypeptide is differentially expressed in certain tumors and that the claimed antibodies can be used as diagnostic tools. Further, there is no need to establish the function of the PRO1268 polypeptide in order to establish the utility of the claimed antibodies. Accordingly, Applicants submit that the PTO has not met its initial burden of overcoming the presumption that the asserted utility is sufficient to satisfy the utility requirement. And even if the PTO has met that burden, the Applicants' supporting rebuttal evidence is sufficient to establish the utility of the claimed antibodies because one of skill in the art would be more likely than not to believe that the claimed antibodies can be used as diagnostic tools for cancer, particularly kidney tumors.

Specific Utility

The Asserted Substantial Utilities are Specific to the Claimed Antibodies

Applicants next submit that the asserted utilities are specific to the claimed antibodies related to PRO1268.

Specific Utility is defined as utility which is "specific to the subject matter claimed," in contrast to "a general utility that would be applicable to the broad class of the invention." M.P.E.P. § 2107.01 I. Applicants submit that the evidence of differential expression of the PRO1268 gene and polypeptide in certain types of tumor cells, along with the declarations and references discussed above, provide a specific utility for the claimed antibodies.

As discussed above, there are significant data which show that the gene for the PRO1268 polypeptide is more highly expressed in kidney tumor tissue than in normal kidney tissue. These data are strong evidence that the PRO1268 gene and polypeptide are associated with kidney tumors. Thus, contrary to the assertions of the PTO, Applicants submit that they have provided evidence associating the PRO1268 gene and polypeptide with a specific disease. The asserted utility of the claimed antibodies as diagnostic tools for cancer, particularly kidney tumor, is a specific utility – it is not a general utility that would apply to the broad class of antibodies.

Conclusion

The PTO has asserted the following arguments to support its conclusion that based on the cited literature, one of skill in the art would doubt the utility of the claimed antibodies: (1) the PTO cites Pennica *et al.*, Haynes *et al.* and Hu *et al.* as teaching that transcript expression levels displaying a 5-fold change or less in tumor compared to normal did not evidence a correlation between altered gene expression and a known role in disease, and that polypeptide levels cannot be accurately predicted from mRNA levels; and (2) the PTO states that since the specification does not disclose any specific function of the PRO1268 mRNA or polypeptide, the claimed subject matter lacks substantial utility. The PTO states that further research needs to be done to support the utility of the claimed antibodies. Applicants have addressed both arguments in turn.

First, Applicants have provided a first Declaration of Chris Grimaldi stating that the gene expression data in Example 18 are real and significant. This declaration also indicates that given the relative difference of at least two-fold in expression levels, the disclosed nucleic acids and corresponding polypeptides and antibodies have utility as cancer diagnostic tools.

Second, Applicants have shown that the second Grimaldi Declaration and Polakis Declaration, the accompanying references, as well as the excerpts and references cited above, demonstrate that it is well-established in the art that a change in mRNA levels generally correlates to a corresponding change in protein levels. Haynes *et al.* and Pennica *et al.* do not address this issue, and are not contrary to Applicants' asserted utility. Hu *et al.*, directed to known roles in disease, is not contrary to Applicants' asserted utility. Thus, the evidence offered by the PTO has not established any substantial reason to question Applicants' declarations and supporting references.

Third, Applicants have shown that since the claimed polypeptides and associated antibodies are useful for cancer diagnosis, it is not necessary to demonstrate the function of the PRO1268 protein in order to establish utility of the claimed invention.

Finally, Applicants have pointed out that the substantial utilities described above are specific to the claimed antibodies because the PRO1268 gene and polypeptide are differentially expressed in kidney tumor cells compared to the corresponding normal kidney cells. This is not a general utility that would apply to the broad class of antibodies.

Given the totality of the evidence provided, Applicants submit that they have established a substantial, specific, and credible utility for the claimed antibodies as diagnostic tools.

According to the PTO Utility Examination Guidelines (2001), irrefutable proof of a claimed utility is <u>not</u> required. Rather, a specific, substantial, and credible utility requires only a "reasonable" confirmation of a real world context of use. Applicants remind the PTO that:

A small degree of utility is sufficient . . . The claimed invention must only be capable of performing some beneficial function . . . An invention does not lack utility merely because the particular embodiment disclosed in the patent lacks perfection or performs crudely . . . A commercially successful product is not required . . . Nor is it essential that the invention accomplish all its intended functions . . . or operate under all conditions . . . partial success being sufficient to demonstrate patentable utility . . . In short, the defense of non-utility cannot be sustained without proof of total incapacity. If an invention is only partially successful in achieving a useful result, a rejection of the claimed invention as a whole based on a lack of utility is not appropriate. M.P.E.P. at 2107.01 (underline emphasis in original, bold emphasis added, citations omitted).

Applicants submit that they have established that it is more likely than not that one of skill in the art would reasonably accept the utility for the claimed antibodies relating to PRO1268 set forth in the specification. In view of the above, Applicants respectfully request that the PTO reconsider and withdraw the utility rejection under 35 U.S.C. §101.

Rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph - Enablement

The PTO also rejects the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. Specifically, the PTO asserts that because the claimed invention is not supported by either a specific or substantial asserted utility or a well-established utility, one skilled in the art would not know how to use the claimed invention.

Applicants submit that in the discussion of the 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection above, Applicants have established a substantial, specific, and credible utility for the claimed antibodies. Applicants therefore respectfully request that the PTO reconsider and withdraw the enablement rejection under 35 U.S.C. §112.

CONCLUSION

In view of the above, Applicants respectfully maintain that claims are patentable and request that they be passed to issue. Applicants invite the Examiner to call the undersigned if any remaining issues might be resolved by telephone.

Please charge any additional fees, including any fees for additional extension of time, or credit overpayment to Deposit Account No. 11-1410.

Respectfully submitted,

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